1 Gravely, Col. T.B. (1950) , "Signal Communications", The National Archives (UK): Public Records Office (TNA): WO 277/25. 2 Nalder, Major-General R. F.H. (1958) , The Royal Corps of Signals. A History of its Antecedents and Development (c 1800 -1955) at Salerno, talking about the "undependable wireless sets of the day", while noting that at Cassino communications within battalions "usually broke down".3 Elsewhere, the official history is peppered with examples of failure which leave the abiding impression of a thoroughly unreliable communications system. Carlo D'Este's book on the Italian campaign provides another example: he wrote that "the notoriously inefficient British wireless sets were all too frequently the bane of the Army during the war".4 Such wording suggests that there were not just problems with wireless communications in general, but British wireless in particular. In other words, D'Este implies that not only were British sets inefficient, but also that they were worse than those of other armies, for example, those of the Americans or the Germans. The contrasting accounts offered by Nalder, Molony and D'Este serve to emphasise that no clear picture is available from published sources as to the efficacy of the British Army's communications during the Second World War. It is the intent of this chapter to try to fill this gap by providing a more balanced, objective assessment. Following a brief summary of the main methods of communication employed by the British Army during the Second World War, this chapter will use the case study of the 5th Infantry Division's crossing of the Garigliano River in Italy in January 1944 as an example of how it is possible for different commentators to draw opposite conclusions about the effectiveness of communications from the same events. Using this example, it will thus be possible to propose a more appropriate method of judging the success or failure of communications in battle. This template will then be used to analyze the effectiveness of British Army communications in amphibious, land and airborne operations in the Mediterranean theater, 1942 to 1944.
The Main Methods of Communication
Communications, as related to the army, are the processes by which information (for example orders or situation reports) is transferred from one location or person to another. During the Second World War, these processes within the British Army were usually in the hands of the Royal Corps of Signals down to battalion HQ level, but were the responsibility of regimental signalers below that. The main methods of battlefield communication available to British
